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Evaluating The Suitability of *Cirrhinus Mrigala* in a Sintex Tank Culture System: A Promising Experimental Study

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Article History	Abstract
Received: 06 June 2023 Revised: 05 Sept 2023 Accepted: 07 Nov 2023	This pioneering study conducted by the Department of Aquaculture aimed to assess the suitability of <i>Cirrhinus Mrigala</i>, a freshwater species, for cultivation in a Sintex tank. The objective was to determine the growth potential and productivity of <i>Cirrhinus Mrigala</i> in this specific tank culture system. Over a period of 60 days, the final weights of the fish specimens were recorded as follows: 2.0g, 4.30g, 6.96g, 9.98g, 11.21g, and 14.17g, respectively. The total fish yield achieved during this period was 437.58 grams, utilizing a natural feeding regime. This study provides valuable insights as the first investigation in this domain, revealing promising indications for the implementation of Sintex tank culture for <i>Cirrhinus Mrigala</i> cultivation.
CC License CC-BY-NC-SA 4.0	Keywords: <i>Cirrhinus mrigala</i> , Sintex tank, Aquaculture, Feeding

1. Introduction

India is globally recognized as the third-largest producer of aquaculture, trailing only behind China (FAO, 2014). The fishing industry in India is a significant contributor to the country's economy, employing over seven million people and generating substantial annual revenue (Gadage RS, 2005). Fisheries and aquaculture play a fundamental role in providing food, nutrition, livelihood, and economic stability for millions of people. Given its affordability and high-quality protein content, fish consumption can contribute to combating hunger and malnutrition in the nation. India's fishing industry has undergone significant development over the years, emerging as a crucial socio-economic sector. The country contributes around 16% of the world's inland fish production and 5% of marine fish production, with a total fish yield of 162.48 lakh tonnes in 2021-2022 (Handbook on Fisheries Statistics, 2022).

Among the various fish species cultivated in India, major carps hold a prominent position due to their rapid growth and high consumer acceptability (V.P. Saini et al., 2014). These carps account for approximately 87% of the country's total freshwater aquaculture production (Ayyappan S and Jena JK, 2003). Consequently, India possesses immense potential for the development of fish-based enterprises, with a focus on fish production, marketing, and consumption. The three primary carps in Indian freshwater aquaculture are Catla (*Catla catla*), Rohu (*Labeo rohita*), and Mrigal (*Cirrhinus mrigala*). These carp species are preferred by farmers due to their fast growth rates and high consumer demand. Additionally, certain exotic carp species, such as *Ctenopharyngodon idella*, *Hypophthalmichthys molitrix*, and *Cyprinus carpio*, have successfully adapted to Indian water conditions (Basant Bais, 2018).

Cirrhinus mrigala, also known as the Mrigal, is a fish species found in rivers and lakes in northern India. They have a streamlined body with a round abdomen and a deeply forked caudal fin. The mouth is wide and transverse, with a depressed snout and a complete top lip. Mrigal has two barbels and golden-colored eyes. It grows to an average length of around 40 cm and is well-suited for aquaculture

in South India. Breeding occurs during the monsoon season, and forced breeding techniques are commonly used in its cultivation. There are several inter-generic hybrid fries available for culture. The fingerlings and adults primarily feed on animal protein. Maturity is reached by the age of two, although induced breed fish may reach maturity at one year old. Natural breeding usually occurs during the monsoon season, and fingerlings are available for sale from July to November. Mrigal can be found in rivers, tanks, and water bodies in regions such as Burma, the major river systems of India, the Deccan, Punjab, Sindh (Pakistan), Cutch, and Bengal (Basant Bais, 2018).

The fishing sector is a significant driver of India's foreign exchange profits and contributes substantially to the national economy. Fish production in India has surged from 56.56 lakh tons in 2000-01 to 162.48 lakh tonnes in 2021-22. Andhra Pradesh, West Bengal, Karnataka, Odisha, and Gujarat are the top five fish-producing states (Handbook on Fisheries Statistics, 2022). Major carps, including *Cirrhinus mrigala*, are important freshwater fish species cultivated in Asia, particularly in the Indian subcontinent. They are also commonly raised in semi-intensive composite culture systems in Pakistan. The aim of fish culture today is to maximize production under intensive culture conditions with the use of artificial nutrients (Silva *et al.*, 2022).

Fish farming, conducted in tanks, ponds, and pools, has gained popularity as more people seek a sustainable and healthy source of food for their families (Bharti, Pandey, and Vennila, 2016; Boyd *et al.*, 2020). Tank culture offers advantages such as reduced feeding and harvesting time, as well as the ability to treat diseases more effectively due to smaller tank volumes. Intensive tank culture can maximize yields even on small parcels of land. However, the aquaculture industry faces challenges such as disease outbreaks, environmental degradation, and labor shortages, which must be overcome to ensure sustainable fish production (Yue and Shen, 2022).

Circular tanks are an attractive choice for fish farming due to their ease of maintenance, ability to maintain uniform water quality, and the option to optimize fish health and condition through control of rotational velocities. Additionally, circular tanks allow for efficient removal of settleable solids through the center drain.

2. Materials And Methods

Tanks for Culturing:

Initially, a Sintex tank was chosen for the experiment. The tank is a round plastic container with a bottom outlet. A pipe was used to bring in water from the outside source (Fig.B and Fig.C).



Fig.A. Study area: Adikavi Nannaya university, Rajamahendravaram (17°03'59"N81°52'23"E)

Fig.B. Water Inlet;

Fig.C. Water Outlet;

Fig.D. Fermentation Process

Fermentation:

To initiate the fermentation process, we used 2 kg of rice bran, 1 kg of jaggery, and 100 grams of yeast powder. These were mixed with 10 liters of water for a 48-hour period (Fig.D).

Selection of Fish Species

Cirrhinus mrigala was selected for the Sintex tank culture based on its economic importance.

Stocking of Fish

Fingerlings of *Cirrhinus mrigala* were obtained from Balabhadrapuram. The fingerlings were transported in polythene bags infused with oxygen. Each fish was weighed and measured before being stocked. A total of 40 fingerlings were stocked in a 1000-liter tank.

Feeding

After stocking, the fishes were fed with natural feed rice bran. The feed amount was 2% of their body weight in the morning at 9:00 AM and in the afternoon at 3:00 PM. After 40 days, the feed amount was increased to 3% of their body weight.

Sintex Tank Management

To properly maintain the Sintex tank, 200 liters of water were added to the 1000-liter tank. The tank was covered with a green fabric to protect it from direct sunlight. Water exchange was done every ten days. Water quality parameters were monitored daily. Feeding was conducted daily at 9:00 AM and 3:00 PM.

Culture Period

The fingerlings were cultured in the Sintex tank for a period of 60 days, from February 2022 to April 2022.

Water Quality Parameters

Important water quality parameters such as temperature, pH, total alkalinity, dissolved oxygen (DO), hardness, ammonia, nitrite, and nitrate were regularly measured and analyzed following the standard procedures recommended by APHA (2000).

3. Results and Discussion

Growth and production performance of *Cirrhinus mrigala* in tank culture

The growth performance of *Cirrhinus mrigala* in a sintex tank in terms of final length and weight, weight gain percentage, specific growth rate (SGR%), daily growth rate (DGR), survival rate, and total production are shown in the table below.

Length Gain

The mean initial length of *Cirrhinus mrigala* for the 60-day culture period was 5.6 cm, 6.2 cm, 7.0 cm, 8.4 cm, 9.6 cm, and 10.2 cm, respectively.

Weight Gain

The percentage of weight gain in natural feeding sintex tanks was 2%, 4.30%, 6.96%, 9.98%, 11.21%, and 14.17%, respectively.

Specific Growth Rates (SGR)

The mean percentage specific growth rates (SGR) over a 60-day period, with 10-day regular intervals, were 0.049%/day/fish, 0.487%/day/fish, 2.551%/day/fish, 4.156%/day/fish, 4.018%/day/fish, and 3.447%/day/fish, 3.263%/day/fish respectively.

Daily Growth Rates (DGR)

The mean daily growth rate of *Cirrhinus mrigala* in natural feeding sintex tanks was 0.01 g/day, 0.115 g/day, 0.165 g/day, 0.199 g/day, 0.184 g/day, and 0.202 g/day, respectively.

Mortality

Out of the 40 fishes placed in the sintex tank, 10 fishes died in the first week. After that, there were no more deaths recorded.

Survival Per Cent

The survival rate was 75%, with most of the deaths occurring in the first ten days of the experiment period.

Yield/Total Production

The total weight gained (yield) of *Cirrhinus mrigala* in the 60-day sintex tank culture with natural feeding was 437.58 g.

Water Quality Parameters


Physical parameters such as temperature and pH, as well as chemical parameters such as dissolved oxygen (DO), alkalinity, hardness, ammonia, nitrite, and nitrate, were measured at daily intervals throughout the study period. The mean values ($\pm$ SD) of water quality parameters for different treatments are shown in the table below.

The main objective of the present study was to assess the suitability of *Cirrhinus mrigala* for tank culture in terms of growth performance with natural feed and the maintenance of water quality parameters.

Water quality parameter:

Every 10 days average pH ranged from 7.5-7.91

Every 10 days average D.O (mg L⁻¹) was ranged from 5.0-6.0 respectively



Graph.1. Water quality parameters of *Cirrhinus Mrigala* tank

Growth performance:

In the present study, during 60 days' time *Cirrhinus Mrigala* attained the weight of 14.17gm. from initial weight of 2gm shown in (Shown in Fig.G and Fig.H)





Fig.E.Initial length; Fig.F.Final length;
Fig.G.Initial weight; Fig.H.Final weight



Graph.2. The above chart indicates the body length of *Cirrhinus Mrigala*

Graph.3. The above chart indicates the body weight of *Cirrhinus Mrigala*.

Table.1. Growth Study of 40 *Cirrhinus Mrigala* Fingerlings Fed Naturally from February 2022 to April 2022

Days	Initial length(cm)	Final length (cm)	Initial weight (gm)	Final weight (gm)	SGR (%)	DGR	Mortality	Survival (%)
1 – 10	5.6	5.6	2	2.001	0.004	0.01	09	77.5
11 -20	5.6	6.3	2.001	4.30	2.551	0.115	00	77.5
21 -30	6.3	7.0	4.30	6.96	4.156	0.165	01	75
31-40	7.0	8.1	6.96	9.98	4.014	0.199	00	75
41-50	8.1	9.4	9.98	11.21	3.447	0.184	00	75
51-60	9.4	10.2	11.21	14.17	3.263	0.202	00	75

Weight gain percentage (WG%), specific growth rate (SGR%), and daily growth rate (DGR) are listed as columns 5, 6, and 7 respectively.

Calculations:

1. For 10 days:

1 piece = 2g

Total = $30 \times 2 = 60 \times 3\% \text{ body weight} / 100 = 1.8\text{g} \times 10 = 18\text{g}$

2. For 20 days:

1 piece = 0.30g

Total = $4.30 \times 30 = 129 \times 3\% \text{ body weight} / 100 = 3.87 \times 10 = 38.7\text{g}$

3. For 30 days:

1 piece = 6.96g

Total = $6.96 \times 30 = 208 \times 3\% \text{ body weight} / 100 = 6.264 \times 10 = 62.64\text{g}$

4. For 40 days:

1 piece = 9.98g

Total = $9.98 \times 30 = 299.4 \times 3\% \text{ body weight} / 100 = 8.982 \times 10 = 89.82\text{g}$

5. For 50 days:

1 piece = 11.21g

Total = $11.21 \times 30 = 336.3 \times 3\% \text{ body weight} / 100 = 10.089 \times 10 = 100.89\text{g}$

6. For 60 days:

1 piece = 14.17g

Total = 14.17 x 30 = 425.1 x 3% body weight / 100 =

12.753 x 10 = 127.53g

Total feed for 60 days = 437.58g

Total body weight = 425.1g

- FCR (Feed Conversion Ratio) = Total consumed by fish / Weight gain by fish

FCR = 437.58 / 425.1

FCR = 1.029 g

Daily weight gain = Final weight - Initial weight / Days

= (14.17 - 2) / 60

= 0.202 g

Length gain = Final length - Initial length

= 10.2 - 5.6

= 4.6 cm

SGR = (LnWt. - LnWi) x 100 / Δt

= (Ln14.17 - Ln2) x 100/60

= (2.651-0.693) * 100/60

= 3.263 %

Table. 2. Physico chemical parameters in sintex tanks at Adikavi Nany University.

Day	Temperature	P ^H	DO	Hardness	Alkalinity	Ammonia	Nitrite	Nitrate
1	26.1 ⁰ C	7.6	6.0	30	60	0	0	0
2	27.1 ⁰ C	7.6	6.0	30	70	0	0	0
3	27.2 ⁰ C	7.7	5.6	40	60	0	0	0
4	27.1 ⁰ C	7.8	5.7	40	70	0	0	0
5	28.3 ⁰ C	7.8	6.0	60	60	0	0	0
6	28.4 ⁰ C	7.9	5.6	60	100	0	0	0
7	26.6 ⁰ C	8.0	5.6	60	80	0	0	0
8	26.3 ⁰ C	8.1	5.4	70	80	0	0	0
9	27 ⁰ C	8.1	5.2	80	80	0	0	0
10	28.2 ⁰ C	8.2	5.0	80	120	0	0	0
11	27.1 ⁰ C	7.6	6.0	40	120	0	0	0
12	27.4 ⁰ C	7.8	6.0	40	100	0	0	0
13	25 ⁰ C	7.9	5.9	50	80	0	0	0
14	27.6 ⁰ C	7.8	5.8	70	60	0	0	0
15	29 ⁰ C	7.7	6.0	40	100	0	0	0
16	29.3 ⁰ C	7.9	5.9	60	80	0	0	0
17	28.20C	8.0	5.5	50	80	0	0	0
18	27.60C	8.1	5.4	50	80	0	0	0
19	25.50C	8.1	5.2	60	90	0	0	0
20	30.10C	8.2	5.0	80	100	0	0	0
21	27.30C	7.9	5.8	60	60	0	0	0
22	24.60C	8.1	6.0	60	80	0	0	0
23	290C	7.5	5.6	40	120	0	0	0
24	26.60C	8.1	6.0	60	100	0	0	0
25	29.10C	7.5	5.6	40	80	0	0	0
26	290C	7.6	5.8	40	80	0	0	0
27	28.40C	7.9	5.7	50	60	0	0	0
28	27.80C	8.0	5.9	60	80	0	0	0

29	280C	7.5	5.8	60	100	0	0	0
30	28.40C	7.4	5.7	80	80	0	0	0
31	280C	7.7	6.0	50	60	0	0	0
32	27.50C	7.9	6.1	50	80	0	0	0
33	27.10C	8.0	5.8	60	80	0	0	0
34	240C	8.1	6.2	80	100	0	0	0
35	29.30C	7.9	5.8	50	80	0	0	0
36	27.80C	7.7	5.8	60	100	0	0	0
37	26.50C	7.6	6.0	50	80	0	0	0
38	28.0C	7.6	5.9	60	80	0.03	0	0.20
39	280C	7.5	5.8	60	100	0.09	0	0.26
40	29.10C	7.5	5.7	50	120	0.10	0	0.96
41	28.10C	7.6	5.8	60	120	0	0	0
42	27.10C	7.8	5.9	50	120	0	0	0
43	25.40C	7.9	6.0	60	100	0	0	0
44	26.20C	8.0	6.1	80	80	0	0	0
45	27.90C	7.8	6.0	80	100	0	0	0
46	28.30C	7.8	5.8	100	80	0	0	0
47	28.60C	7.7	5.8	120	100	0	0	0
48	30.20C	7.6	5.7	140	120	0.02	0	0.25
49	32.10C	7.5	5.6	180	130	0.06	0	0.86
50	30.20C	7.5	5.7	160	110	0.12	0	1.01
51	27.90C	7.8	6.2	40	100	0	0	0
52	28.20C	7.9	6.0	50	80	0	0	0
53	29.60C	7.9	6.0	60	80	0	0	0
54	30.10C	7.8	5.8	80	100	0	0	0
55	30.30C	7.7	5.6	100	120	0	0	0
56	31.00C	7.7	5.5	120	100	0	0	0
57	32.10C	7.8	5.4	100	120	0.04	0	0.92
58	31.60C	7.9	5.5	120	100	0.12	0	1.56
59	32.10C	7.6	5.4	140	120	0.18	0	2.92
Total	1691.9	467.7	340	4210	5470	1.01	0	13.26
Total/10	28.19	7.795	5.66	70.16	91.16	0.016	0	0.221

The results of the present study are supported by previous researchers who conducted experiments on growth and survival tests with different supplementary diets for various fish species (Abbas et al., 2010; Rahman & Rahman, 1999). Table. 2 shows the water qualities measured in the sintex tank during the fingerling raising. The temperature, pH, dissolved oxygen, and total alkalinity were found to be within the ideal range for the growth of these carp species (Jana & De, 1988, 1993; Jena et al., 1998).

4. Conclusion

Based on the findings, *Cirrhinus mrigala* was found to be a suitable fish species for sintex tank culture at the Adikavi Nannaya University. However, since sintex tank culture is not well-known among local businesspeople and fishermen, it is necessary to conduct root-level extension programs to increase awareness and acceptance of these cultural practices. Given the wide regional distribution of *Cirrhinus mrigala* in India and its consumer acceptance, it is crucial to prioritize the modification and advancement of techniques for its culture. Considering the eco-socio-economic context of the smallscale farmers, tank culture of *Cirrhinus mrigala* seems to be the most viable option for sustainable fish production. Especially for a densely populated country like India, sintex tank culture is essential.

Acknowledgement

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Cover Page



KUBERNETES: STEALING SERVICE ACCOUNT TOKENS TO OBTAIN CLUSTER-ADMIN

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Abstract

In this paper first I would like to explain about kubernetes cluster also we have discussed here about Host Enumeration, Lmit Ranger & RBAC *ROLE*. After that I would like to Kubernetes security is a complex subject that relies on well-designed Role-Based Access Control (RBAC). Kubernetes service account tokens contain the permissions an application utilizes to authenticate and perform actions in a Kubernetes environment.

1.Introduction

Kubernetes is one of the fastest-growing technologies in today's current market.

Google originally built it as part of their Borg system to deploy and operate containerized applications at scale, and in 2014 it was released as open source under the name Kubernetes (Metz, 2014). Since then, Kubernetes adoption has grown tremendously and is now utilized by 70% of organizations, as shown by Red Hat (Cormier, 2022). This rapid growth has not been without its share of problems. Over the years, numerous security incidents, data breaches, and outages have resulted from poorly understood and misconfigured security environments. This paper explores how Kubernetes privileges tie into Kubernetes service account tokens, how these tokens are utilized to compromise a Kubernetes cluster, and recommendations to detect and defend against service account token compromise.

2. Kubernetes Architecture


Kubernetes components are generally grouped into Control Plane components and Node Components. The Control Plane components oversee scheduling pods, handling processes, interfacing with cloud environments, storing all cluster data, and perhaps most importantly, exposing the Kubernetes Application Programming Interfaces (APIs) for others to access via the API server component. Node components, also known as worker node components, run Kubernetes pods via the kubelet, kube-proxy, and containerruntime.

2.1.Kubernetes Cluster:

A Kubernetes cluster consists of a set of worker machines, called nodes that run containerized applications. Every cluster has at least one worker node.

The worker node(s) host the Pods that are the components of the application workload. The control plane manages the worker nodes and the Pods in the cluster. In production environments, the control plane usually runs across multiple computers and a cluster usually runs multiple nodes, providing fault-tolerance and high availability.

This document outlines the various components you need to have for a complete and working Kubernetes cluster.



Kubernetes components are generally grouped into Control Plane components and Node Components. The Control Plane components oversee scheduling pods, handling processes, interfacing with cloud environments, storing all cluster data, and perhaps most importantly, exposing the Kubernetes Application Programming Interfaces (APIs) for others to access via the API server component. Node components, also known as worker node components, run Kubernetes pods via the kubelet, kube-proxy, and containerruntime.

2.2. Kubernetes Pods

Kubernetes created a **Pod** to host your application instance. A Pod is a Kubernetes abstraction that represents a group of one or more application containers (such as Docker), and some shared resources for those containers. Those resources include:

- Shared storage, as Volumes
- Networking, as a unique cluster IP address
- Information about how to run each container, such as the container image version or specific ports to use

A Pod models an application-specific "logical host" and can contain different application containers which are relatively tightly coupled. For example, a Pod might include both the container with your Node.js app as well as a different container that feeds the data to be published by the Node.js webserver. The containers in a Pod share an IP Address and port space, are always co-located and co-scheduled, and run in a shared context on the same Node.

Pods are the atomic unit on the Kubernetes platform. When we create a Deployment on Kubernetes, that Deployment creates Pods with containers inside them (as opposed to creating containers directly). Each Pod is tied to the Node where it is scheduled, and remains there until termination (according to restart policy) or deletion. In case of a Node failure, identical Pods are scheduled on other available Nodes in the cluster.



Cover Page




2.3. Nodes:

A Pod always runs on a **Node**. A Node is a worker machine in Kubernetes and may be either a virtual or a physical machine, depending on the cluster. Each Node is managed by the control plane. A Node can have multiple pods, and the Kubernetes control plane automatically handles scheduling the pods across the Nodes in the cluster. The control plane's automatic scheduling takes into account the available resources on each Node.

Every Kubernetes Node runs at least:

- Kubelet, a process responsible for communication between the Kubernetes control plane and the Node; it manages the Pods and the containers running on a machine.
- A container runtime (like Docker) responsible for pulling the container image from a registry, unpacking the container, and running the application.

Node overview



2.4.Volumes

On-disk files in a container are ephemeral, which presents some problems for non-trivial applications when running in containers. One problem occurs when a container crashes or is stopped. Container state is not saved so all of the files that were created or modified during the lifetime of the container are lost. During a crash, kubelet restarts the container with a clean state. Another problem occurs when multiple containers are running in a Pod and need to share files. It can be challenging to setup and access a shared filesystem across all of the containers. The Kubernetes volume abstraction solves both of these problems. Familiarity with Pods is suggested.



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2.4.1.Persistent Volumes:

Managing storage is a distinct problem from managing compute instances. The PersistentVolume subsystem provides an API for users and administrators that abstracts details of how storage is provided from how it is consumed. To do this, we introduce two new API resources: PersistentVolume and PersistentVolumeClaim.

A *PersistentVolume* (PV) is a piece of storage in the cluster that has been provisioned by an administrator or dynamically provisioned using Storage Classes. It is a resource in the cluster just like a node is a cluster resource. PVs are volume plugins like Volumes, but have a lifecycle independent of any individual Pod that uses the PV. This API object captures the details of the implementation of the storage, be that NFS, iSCSI, or a cloud-provider-specific storage system.

A *PersistentVolumeClaim* (PVC) is a request for storage by a user. It is similar to a Pod. Pods consume node resources and PVCs consume PV resources. Pods can request specific levels of resources (CPU and Memory). Claims can request specific size and access modes (e.g., they can be mounted ReadWriteOnce, ReadOnlyMany or ReadWriteMany, see AccessModes).

While PersistentVolumeClaims allow a user to consume abstract storage resources, it is common that users need PersistentVolumes with varying properties, such as performance, for different problems. Cluster administrators need to be able to offer a variety of PersistentVolumes that differ in more ways than size and access modes, without exposing users to the details of how those volumes are implemented. For these needs, there is the *StorageClass* resource.

3. Findings

Host Enumeration, Lmit Ranger & RBAC ROLE:

Kubernetes doesn't provide default resource limits out-of-the-box. This means that unless you explicitly define limits, your containers can consume unlimited CPU and memory.

Resource limits are enforced at the container level but are usually defined as part of the Deployment, like this:

```

apiVersion: apps/v1
kind: Deployment
metadata:
  name: nginx
  labels:
    app: nginx
spec:
  replicas: 1
  selector:
    matchLabels:
      app: nginx
  template:
    metadata:
      labels:
        app: nginx
    spec:
      containers:
        - name: nginx
          image: nginx
          ports:
            - containerPort: 80
          resources:
            limits:
              cpu: 100m
            requests:
              cpu: 100m

```



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You can also define a default limit for pods that don't specify their own limits. This is done by creating a Limit Range in the relevant namespace:

```
apiVersion: v1
kind: LimitRange
metadata:
  name: my-limit
spec:
  limits:
  - default:
      memory: 512Mi
      cpu: 100m
    type: Container
```

Kubernetes is also kind enough to document the change with an annotation:

Kubectl-n test describepod | grep Annotations

Annotations: **kubernetes.io/limit-ranger: LimitRanger plugin set: cpu, memory request for container nginx; cpu, memory limit for container nginx**

Limit Ranges Have Some Surprising Behaviors

1. New Kubernetes clusters have a single predefined Limit Range named "limits" in the default namespace with CPU limit set to 100m (that's 1/10 of a CPU core). Other namespaces don't have a default Limit Range but you can create them on your own.
2. There may be multiple Limit Ranges per namespace. In this case, Kubernetes will use one of them for the default limits (and all of them for min and max limits).
3. Containers that were created before the Limit Range will not be affected by it.

3.2.Limit Ranger:

This admission controller will observe the incoming request and ensure that it does not violate any of the constraints enumerated in the LimitRange object in a Namespace. If you are using LimitRange objects in your Kubernetes deployment, you MUST use this admission controller to enforce those constraints. LimitRanger can also be used to apply default resource requests to Pods that don't specify any; currently, the default LimitRanger applies a 0.1 CPU requirement to all Pods in the default namespace.

```
apiVersion: v1
kind: Pod
metadata:
  creationTimestamp: null
  labels:
    run: research-pod
  name: research-pod
spec:
  serviceAccountName: argocd-application-controller
  automountServiceAccountToken: true
  containers:
  - image: nginx
    name: research-pod
    resources: {}
  dnsPolicy: ClusterFirst
  restartPolicy: Always
  status: {}
```




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The attacker can exec into the pod and gain shell access, download the kubectl binary, and then run the kubectl binary from within the pod with full cluster admin privileges. Other service accounts can be specified, and attackers can test multiple service accounts until they obtain the desired privileges.

3.3.ROLE AND CLUSTERROLE:

An RBAC *Role* or *ClusterRole* contains rules that represent a set of permissions. Permissions are purely additive (there are no "deny" rules). A Role always sets permissions within a particular namespace; when you create a Role, you have to specify the namespace it belongs in. ClusterRole, by contrast, is a non-namespaced resource. The resources have different names (Role and ClusterRole) because a Kubernetes object always has to be either namespaced or not namespaced; it can't be both.

ClusterRoles have several uses. You can use a ClusterRole to:

1. Define permissions on namespaced resources and be granted access within individual namespace(s)
2. Define permissions on namespaced resources and be granted access across all namespaces
3. Define permissions on cluster-scoped resources

If you want to define a role within a namespace, use a Role; if you want to define a role cluster-wide, use a ClusterRole.

Role example

Here's an example Role in the "default" namespace that can be used to grant read access to pods:

```
apiVersion: rbac.authorization.k8s.io/v1
kind: Role
metadata:
  namespace: default
  name: pod-reader
rules:
- apiGroups: [""] # "" indicates the core API group
  resources: ["pods"]
  verbs: ["get", "watch", "list"]
```

ClusterRole example

A ClusterRole can be used to grant the same permissions as a Role. Because ClusterRoles are cluster-scoped, you can also use them to grant access to:

- Cluster-scoped resources (like nodes)
- Non-resource endpoints (like /healthz)
- Namespaced resources (like Pods), across all namespaces

For example: you can use a ClusterRole to allow a particular user to run kubectl get pods --all-namespaces

Here is an example of a ClusterRole that can be used to grant read access to secrets in any particular namespace, or across all namespaces (depending on how it is bound):



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apiVersion: rbac.authorization.k8s.io/v1

kind: ClusterRole

metadata:

"namespace" omitted since ClusterRoles are not namespaced

name: secret-reader

rules:

- apiGroups: [""]

#

at the HTTP level, the name of the resource for accessing Secret

objects is "secrets"

resources: ["secrets"]

verbs: ["get", "watch", "list"]

The name of a Role or a ClusterRole object must be a valid path segment name.

3.4. Role Binding and ClusterRoleBinding

A role binding grants the permissions defined in a role to a user or set of users. It holds a list of *subjects* (users, groups, or service accounts), and a reference to the role being granted. A RoleBinding grants permissions within a specific namespace whereas a ClusterRoleBinding grants that access cluster-wide.

A RoleBinding may reference any Role in the same namespace. Alternatively, a RoleBinding can reference a ClusterRole and bind that ClusterRole to the namespace of the RoleBinding. If you want to bind a ClusterRole to all the namespaces in your cluster, you use a ClusterRoleBinding.

The name of a RoleBinding or ClusterRoleBinding object must be a valid path segment name.

RoleBinding examples

Here is an example of a RoleBinding that grants the "pod-reader" Role to the user "jane" within the "default" namespace. This allows "jane" to read pods in the "default" namespace.

apiVersion: rbac.authorization.k8s.io/v1

This role binding allows "jane" to read pods in the "default" namespace.

You need to already have a Role named "pod-reader" in that namespace.

kind: RoleBinding

metadata:

name: read-pods

namespace: default

subjects:

You can specify more than one "subject"

- kind: User

name: jane *# "name" is case sensitive*

apiGroup: rbac.authorization.k8s.io

roleRef:

"roleRef" specifies the binding to a Role / ClusterRole

kind: Role *#this must be Role or ClusterRole*

name: pod-reader *# this must match the name of the Role or ClusterRole you wish to bind to*

apiGroup: rbac.authorization.k8s.io



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A RoleBinding can also reference a ClusterRole to grant the permissions defined in that ClusterRole to resources inside the RoleBinding's namespace. This kind of reference lets you define a set of common roles across your cluster, then reuse them within multiple namespaces.

For instance, even though the following RoleBinding refers to a ClusterRole, "dave" (the subject, case sensitive) will only be able to read Secrets in the "development" namespace, because the RoleBinding's namespace (in its metadata) is "development".

```

apiVersion: rbac.authorization.k8s.io/v1
# This role binding allows "dave" to read secrets in the "development" namespace.
# You need to already have a ClusterRole named "secret-reader".
kind: RoleBinding
metadata:
name: read-secrets
#
# The namespace of the RoleBinding determines where the permissions are granted.
# This only grants permissions within the "development" namespace.
namespace: development
subjects:
- kind: User
name: dave # Name is case sensitive
apiGroup: rbac.authorization.k8s.io
roleRef:
kind: ClusterRole
name: secret-reader
apiGroup: rbac.authorization.k8s.io

```

ClusterRoleBinding example

To grant permissions across a whole cluster, you can use a ClusterRoleBinding. The following ClusterRoleBinding allows any user in the group "manager" to read secrets in any namespace.

```

apiVersion: rbac.authorization.k8s.io/v1
# This cluster role binding allows anyone in the "manager" group to read secrets in any namespace.
kind: ClusterRoleBinding
metadata:
name: read-secrets-global
subjects:
- kind: Group
name: manager # Name is case sensitive
apiGroup: rbac.authorization.k8s.io
roleRef:
kind: ClusterRole
name: secret-reader
apiGroup: rbac.authorization.k8s.io

```



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After you create a binding, you cannot change the Role or ClusterRole that it refers to. If you try to change a binding's roleRef, you get a validation error. If you do want to change the roleRef for a binding, you need to remove the binding object and create a replacement.

There are two reasons for this restriction:

1. Making roleRef immutable allows granting someone update permission on an existing binding object, so that they can manage the list of subjects, without being able to change the role that is granted to those subjects.
2. A binding to a different role is a fundamentally different binding. Requiring a binding to be deleted/recreated in order to change the roleRef ensures the full list of subjects in the binding is intended to be granted the new role (as opposed to enabling or accidentally modifying only the roleRef without verifying all of the existing subjects should be given the new role's permissions).

The kubectl auth reconcile command-line utility creates or updates a manifest file containing RBAC objects, and handles deleting and recreating binding objects if required to change the role they refer to. See command usage and examples for more information.

Referring to resources

In the Kubernetes API, most resources are represented and accessed using a string representation of their object name, such as pods for a Pod. RBAC refers to resources using exactly the same name that appears in the URL for the relevant API endpoint. Some Kubernetes APIs involve a *subresource*, such as the logs for a Pod. A request for a Pod's logs looks like:

```
GET /api/v1/namespaces/{namespace}/pods/{name}/log
```

In this case, pods is the namespaced resource for Pod resources, and log is a subresource of pods. To represent this in an RBAC role, use a slash (/) to delimit the resource and subresource. To allow a subject to read pods and also access the log subresource for each of those Pods, you write:

```
apiVersion: rbac.authorization.k8s.io/v1
```

```
kind: Role
```

```
metadata:
```

```
namespace: default
```

```
name: pod-and-pod-logs-reader
```

```
rules:
```

```
- apiGroups: [""]
```

```
resources: ["pods", "pods/log"]
```

```
verbs: ["get", "list"]
```

You can also refer to resources by name for certain requests through the resourceName list. When specified, requests can be restricted to individual instances of a resource. Here is an example that restricts its subject to only get or update a ConfigMap named my-configmap:

```
apiVersion: rbac.authorization.k8s.io/v1
```

```
kind: Role
```

```
metadata:
```

```
namespace: default
```

```
name: configmap-updater
```



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rules:

- **apiGroups:** [""]

#

at the HTTP level, the name of the resource for accessing ConfigMap

objects is "configmaps"

resources: ["configmaps"]

resourceNames: ["my-configmap"]

verbs: ["update", "get"]

Rather than referring to individual resources, apiGroups, and verbs, you can use the wildcard * symbol to refer to all such objects. For nonResourceURLs, you can use the wildcard * as a suffix glob match. For resourceNames, an empty set means that everything is allowed. Here is an example that allows access to perform any current and future action on all current and future resources in the example.com API group. This is similar to the built-in cluster-admin role.

apiVersion: rbac.authorization.k8s.io/v1

kind: Role

metadata:

namespace: default

name: example.com-superuser # *DO NOT USE THIS ROLE, IT IS JUST AN EXAMPLE*

rules:

- **apiGroups:** ["example.com"]

resources: ["*"]

verbs: ["*"]

4.Post-Compromise

Once an attacker obtains cluster admin, the post-compromise phase can begin. During this phase, the attacker may work on establishing persistence in case their initial attack vector is discovered and closed. There are numerous paths in Kubernetes, and Linux environments in general, that an attacker can take advantage of for persistence. A few notable persistence vectors are included below.

4.1. System:Masters Group

With cluster admin, an attacker can establish a presence on any control plane node and steal the CA certificates in /etc/kubernetes/pki. For good measure, the attacker can steal the Kubernetes and ETCD certificates. This way, the attacker can authenticate against the Kubernetes API and the ETCD database that hosts all the information for the Kubernetes environment, dump the ETCD contents, and further compromise their target.

The Kubernetes certificates can create a new 'user' in the system:masters group. The system:masters group allows unrestricted access to the Kubernetes API without needing any roles or rolebindings. Every role/rolebinding could be deleted from a Kubernetes environment, and an attacker with access to the system:masters group would still have full administrative access to the entire cluster.

Creating accounts in the system:masters group is easier said than done since it is blocked within Kubernetes by an admission controller called CertificateSubjectRestriction (McCune, 2022). While this blocks the ability to approve certificate signing requests within Kubernetes for the system:masters group, attackers can still create the certificates using other tools such as openssl (Buskermolen, 2022). If the attacker has valid CA certificates from the Control Plane node, they can create their user certs on another computer and use them to take complete control.

4.2 Widespread Host Compromise via Daemonsets

Attackers can establish even more persistence on the actual hosts by creating additional user accounts, creating cronjobs, setting up reverse shells, and hiding artifacts throughout the compromised systems. Many of these activities can be accomplished using Kubernetes, running commands from highly privileged pods, and creating daemonsets to ensure the



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Pods are installed on every node in the Kubernetes cluster. Even a Kubernetes environment with thousands of nodes could be attacked this way since daemonsets ensure a workload runs on every single node of a Kubernetes cluster.

Tolerations would likely need to be added to the daemonsets configuration. However, an attacker with complete control of the Kubernetes environment can quickly determine the configurations needed to ensure their daemonsets run on every node.

4.3 ETCD Compromise

ETCD is a highly-available, distributed key-value store that Kubernetes uses to store all cluster data. While there are Kubernetes environments that utilize other data stores, ETCD is the most common. An attacker with access to the ETCD certificates located on the control plane nodes can authenticate with ETCD and use this access to monitor when secrets are added, modified, or deleted. They can also modify cluster data, bypass RBAC, and inject their modified data into ETCD. If the attacker has network access to the ETCD data stores, this can be done outside the Kubernetes environment. Controlling ETCD is another way to establish complete control over a Kubernetes cluster since the attacker can essentially control the data that Kubernetes relies on to make authentication and authorization decisions (LobuhiSec, 2023).

4.4. Beyond Kubernetes

Although this research targets on-prem environments, it would not be complete without mentioning exploitation risks in cloud environments. Over the last few years, Kubernetes adoption has grown immensely and has been coined by many organizations as the operating system of the cloud. Attackers that attack and compromise Kubernetes ecosystems hosted in cloud environments can often migrate to the cloud infrastructure, steal sensitive information, and install crypto-miners. An example is a recent attack, SCARLETEEL (Pellitteri, 2023), on one firm's Kubernetes environment hosted in Amazon Web Services (AWS). The attacker compromised the cloud environment by exploiting a vulnerable Kubernetes pod and then used the privileges gained from that pod to deploy containers with crypto-mining software. The attackers could then move from the Kubernetes environment into the AWS environment and access some of the firm's sensitive data.

The distributed nature of Kubernetes and its ability to host many types of applications requiring different levels of permissions can provide a lucrative attack surface for an attacker. Understanding which applications have privileges an attacker will target is essential. An organization that understands what privileges are being requested by their applications can take steps towards minimizing those permissions or moving highly privileged applications away from public-facing applications and onto hardened areas of the network.

5. Cluster Defense

Engineers responsible for building, operating, and maintaining Kubernetes environments must take a multi-faceted approach to secure their environments. Enumeration of an environment is one of the first steps an attacker will attempt when targeting a Kubernetes environment. With the enumeration phase so crucial for an attacker, it makes sense that it is just as crucial for defenders. There are numerous steps a defender can take to make enumeration (and overall compromise) by an attacker more difficult. The following steps are discussed:

1. Enforce Pod Security Standards
2. Limit Service Account Auto-mount
3. Review RBAC Permissions and Follow Least Privilege
4. Encrypt Secrets
5. Utilize Network Policies defender can take to make enumeration (and overall compromise) by an attacker more difficult. The following steps are discussed:

1. Enforce Pod Security Standards
2. Limit Service Account Auto-mount
3. Review RBAC Permissions and Follow Least Privilege
4. Encrypt Secrets
5. Utilize Network Policies



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5.1. Enforce Pod Security Standards

Enumeration of the research environment depends on having access to the /var/lib/kubelet directory on the Kubernetes hosts, which is generally locked down to the root user. An attacker must be able to escape the confines of whatever Kubernetes pod they have access to and escalate their permissions to root on the Kubernetes host before they can begin their service account token enumeration. Without escaping the Kubernetes pod, an attacker might only have access to the privileges granted by the service account token inside the pod (if it is mounted). An attacker can use various methods to escape from a Kubernetes pod. Fortunately, there are Pod Security Standards available in Kubernetes that can mitigate most of the methods an attacker has available to them. Pod Security Standards provide three different policies that can be utilized to restrict a Kubernetes environment. The three policies are Privileged, Baseline, and Restricted (*Pod security standards* 2023). The Privileged policy is intentionally unrestricted and should not be used in a production environment. For most environments, the Baseline policy will meet the majority of security needs and will provide a significant amount of protection from container/pod breakouts. The research environment operated on the premise that an attacker could access a privileged pod and use it to break out into the host operating system. This escalation vector would be blocked since the Baseline policy disallows privileged containers. The primary Kubernetes documentation has additional details on what specific capabilities Pod Security Standards block and is located at <https://kubernetes.io/docs/concepts/security/pod-security-standards/>. Pod Security Standards must be thoroughly tested before moving them to enforce mode. The Kubernetes documentation provides the following example that can apply an audit/warn baseline policy to all namespaces. `kubectl label --overwrite ns --all \ pod-security.kubernetes.io/audit=baseline \ pod-security.kubernetes.io/warn=baseline.`

5.2.Limit Service Account Auto-mount

Service account tokens are only created if a service account or pod is configured to mount the token. In Kubernetes, a default service account is created in every namespace and is auto-mounted to pods that do not specify a service account. This behavior can be turned off by specifying automountServiceAccountToken: false in the service account or pod configuration. If an application does not need to access the Kubernetes API, it should not have a token mounted. Only mounting necessary tokens will help ensure that Kubernetes engineers are more explicit in what applications can access the API. This also limits the number of service account tokens an attacker can access if the attacker manages to compromise any of the Kubernetes hosts.

5.3.Review RBAC Permissions and Follow Least Privilege

Role-Based Access Control can quickly become overwhelming for engineers. Fortunately, there are many solutions to assist with understanding RBAC. One site called RBAC.dev has a well-curated list of resources for documentation, talks, and tooling concerning Kubernetes RBAC. Additional notable resources are listed below.

- RBAC.dev
- OWASP Kubernetes Security Cheat Sheet
- OWASP Kubernetes Security Testing Guide (KSTG)
- Kubernetes.io Security Documentation
- Kubernetes.io RBAC Good Practices
- Threat Matrix for Kubernetes
- HackTricks Kubernetes Pentesting
- NSA Kubernetes Hardening Guide

Although tools exist for enumerating Kubernetes privileges, the author had difficulty finding a tool or script that was easy to utilize and could list the privileges for every service account on a particular node. The difficulty finding tools led the author to create the script called kubelet-defendernum.sh.



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```
for mydir in $(find /var/lib/kubelet/pods -name namespace -exec dirname {} \); do
    echo "Checking $mydir"
    export cert=$mydir/ca.crt
    export token=$mydir/token
    export namespace=$mydir/namespace
    export apiserver=$(netstat -n | grep 6443 | awk '{ print $5 }' | uniq)
    export whoami=$(kubectl whoami --token=$(cat $token))
    export tokenexpiration=$(jq -R 'split(".")' | [0:2] | map(@base64d) | map(fromjson)'
<<< $(cat $token) | jq '[1].exp')
    echo -e "\n"
    echo "Checking privileges for --$whoami--"
    echo "Service account expires @$(date -d @$tokenexpiration)"
    echo "$cert $namespace $token $apiserver"
    mv /root/.kube/config /root/.kube/enum-config
    kubectl --certificate-authority=$cert --token=$(cat $token) --namespace=$(cat
$namespace) --server=https://$apiserver auth can-i --list
    #Checking for Risky privileges in all service account tokens
    echo -e "\n"
    echo "Does this service account have full cluster-admin privileges?"
    kubectl --certificate-authority=$cert --token=$(cat $token) --namespace=$(cat
$namespace) --server=https://$apiserver auth can-i "*" "*" --all-namespaces
    echo "Can this service account list secrets in kube-system (Quick way to get cluster
admin)?"
    kubectl --certificate-authority=$cert --token=$(cat $token) --namespace=$(cat
$namespace) --server=https://$apiserver auth can-i list secrets -n kube-system
    mv /root/.kube/enum-config /root/.kube/config
    echo -e "\n"
done
```

In order to entirely run the script, jq and netstat must be installed on the server. The script utilizes netstat to locate the API server address from a worker node. However, the script can be modified to manually specify the API server address if it is already known. Additionally, the kubectl package manager called Krew, and the Kubernetes plugin whoami, must be installed. The whoami plugin requires a valid kubeconfig file in ~/.kube/config to help enumerate which service account a token applies to. *Kubectl auth can-i* will enumerate the permissions in the present kubeconfig instead of the actual service account token. Hence, the script temporarily moves the kubeconfig file during each loop iteration to ensure the token permissions of the service accounts are enumerated. The script can tell which service account token permissions are tied to, when the token expires, and what the token's permissions are. The last part of the script makes two specific checks to see if the token has cluster-admin privileges and if the token can list secrets in the kube-system namespace.



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```

Checking /var/lib/kubelet/pods/7649d57b-9a09-4795-8954-
e353ded78518/volumes/kubernetes.io~projected/kube-api-access-ql7m2
Checking privileges for —system:serviceaccount:default:argocd-application-
controller—
Service account expires @Mon May 6 09:44:14 PM EDT 2024
192.168.10.100:6443

Resources      Non-Resource  Resource  Verbs
               URLs          Names
*.*            []            []         [*]
               [*]          []         [*]
applications.argoproj.io []            []         [create get]
appprojects.argoproj.io []            []         [create get list watch update patch
delete]
events         []            []         [create list]
configmaps     []            []         [get list watch]
secrets        []            []         [get list watch]

Does this service account have full cluster-admin privileges?
yes
Can this service account list secrets in kube-system (Quick way to get cluster admin)?
yes

```

As mentioned earlier, listing secrets can be an easy way to escalate privileges, such as by listing the secret for the clusterrole-aggregation-controller service account and using its escalate privilege to obtain cluster admin. If the clusterrole-aggregation-controller service account does not have a secret generated, a service account token that can create secrets can be utilized to create the secret. Another token with get, list, or watch secret privileges can then grab the token.

5.4.Encrypt Secrets

Kubernetes secrets are not encrypted by default which presents a security risk if an attacker gains access to ETCD or can view secrets within Kubernetes. By setting up encryption at rest for secrets, the risks posed by an attacker stealing secrets are significantly minimized. An attacker would also need to access the control plane servers to steal the encryption keys before they could utilize them. Suppose an attacker already has access to the host file system of the control plane servers. In that case, they likely have cluster admin or can quickly obtain cluster admin, indicating a much larger issue than unencrypted secret data.

In addition to restricting the RBAC privileges for secrets, engineers should encrypt the secrets to prevent an attacker with API or ETCD access from utilizing them. Kubernetes provides documentation at <https://kubernetes.io/docs/tasks/administercluster/encrypt-data/#ensure-all-secrets-are-encrypted> that explains how to encrypt Kubernetes secrets. Other best practices for secret management should include not logging the secret data in the clear, not storing secrets in pod configurations, deployments, and other Kubernetes workloads, and ensuring unencrypted secrets are not checked into source code repositories.

5.5.Utilize Network Policies

Kubernetes operates on a flat network that allows all namespaces to talk to each other. Flat networks are great for ease of use and simplicity, but there are better options when it comes to security. The Calico network plugin was chosen for the research environment since it supports network policies. A network policy allows engineers to restrict communication between namespaces, pods, IPs, and ports. This is especially useful in multi-tenant environments where administrators



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must restrict communication between tenant environments. An attacker or malicious user will have difficulty enumerating and compromising environments that have created and implemented network policies on their namespaces.

5.6.Detecting Attacker Enumeration

Kubernetes has extensive logging capabilities that can be utilized to detect malicious activity. In order to take advantage of the logging capabilities, auditing must be turned on and audit policies configured. Care must also be taken when configuring audit policies to ensure secret data is not inadvertently collected. Audit logging does increase memory consumption, but its value is worth the extra resources. According to the Kubernetes documentation, auditing allows the following questions to be answered:

What happened?

- When did it happen?
- Who initiated it?
- On what resources did it happen?
- Where was it observed?
- From where was it initiated?
- To where was it going?

The audit data can be sent to a remote web API, and engineers can set up alerts when suspicious activity is detected. Third-party tools can also be configured to assist with threat hunting, such as the open-source tool Falco. A combination of audit logging and threat hunting can quickly detect when attackers begin enumerating service account tokens. An application will rarely query what privileges it possesses, which makes the activity stand out. Audit logs will provide additional details to help engineers stop further malicious activity and catch the attacker early in the enumeration phase before they can compromise the entire cluster.

6.Recommendations and Implications for Future Research

Kubernetes security is complicated, and the speed at which it is being adopted and improved makes securing it even more difficult. When securing Kubernetes, the primary recommendation for engineers is to ensure RBAC privileges are planned out, enforced, and regularly reviewed. The scripts provided in this paper are a great start to evaluating what privileges applications are requesting and can be customized, extended, or improved to fit an organization's needs. With additional developer support, the scripts can even be turned into an open-source tool that others can utilize. Research is needed to create additional examples of how specific privileges can lead to privilege escalation and how those privileges are mapped to popular applications.

Mapping applications and their risky privileges will help ensure engineers and developers are informed on what RBAC risks various applications pose so that design decisions can be made regarding how to secure the applications.

Multiple kubelet-defendernum.sh script runs have shown that service account tokens are valid for one year. The Kubernetes documentation states that API credentials are obtained using the TokenRequest API and have a bounded lifetime of one hour, which is different from the case in Kubernetes v1.26 since automatically generated service account tokens all show as valid for one year. Deleting the pod associated with a service account token invalidates/deletes the token. However, until the pod is deleted, an attacker can continue utilizing the token without it expiring. Additional research to validate this assumption needs to be performed, and awareness should be drawn to it if the assumption is correct.

Lastly, limited documentation mentions service accounts in the /var/lib/kubelet/pods directory on Kubernetes hosts. The information should be added to the primary Kubernetes documentation.



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7.Conclusion

Kubernetes adoption continues to increase in many industries, and the ease, simplicity, and speed at which new applications are deployed is enticing to engineers, businesses, developers, and users. Unfortunately, this adoption has also significantly increased complexity and security blind spots. Large numbers of service account tokens can be enumerated at once, an attacker can combine the privileges to perform privilege escalation, and the attacker can gain control of an entire Kubernetes cluster.

In most cases, the attacker will require privileged host access to one or more of the worker nodes, but once they obtain that access, the process of chaining privileges can begin. One token may have permission to create pods, and another might be able to create secrets in the kube-system namespace, while another might be able to read secrets in the kube-system namespace. An attacker can quickly move from one compromised host to cluster admin with access to multiple service account tokens and a deep understanding of Kubernetes RBAC.

This research has provided many examples of how an attacker can abuse and chain RBAC privileges and steps that defenders can take to protect their Kubernetes clusters. Constant vigilance by defenders is required, but the likelihood of compromise can be significantly reduced by following recommended Kubernetes security best practices, implementing auditing and threat hunting, and regularly reviewing the privileges requests by all the applications running in their environment.

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Digital Forming In Horticulture Revolutioning Crop Management And Monitoring

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Abstract:

Digital farming technologies have revolutionized horticulture, reshaping traditional crop management and monitoring approaches. This review delves into the transformative impact of these technological advancements on optimizing crop production, resource management, and monitoring practices. It encompasses an array of innovative tools, including drones, satellites for remote sensing, IoT-based sensors, and sophisticated data analytics powered by artificial intelligence. These technologies enable precision irrigation, remote crop health monitoring, automated harvesting, and smart pest and disease detection. Their integration has resulted in enhanced resource efficiency, amplified crop yields, economic benefits, and sustainable agricultural practices. Despite their promise, challenges like technological barriers, costs, data security, and integration hurdles within conventional agricultural systems persist. Real-world case studies exemplify successful implementations, showcasing the potential and complexities of integrating digital farming into horticulture. The review highlights future perspectives and emerging trends, indicating a transformative shift in agricultural practices. The transformative potential of digital farming in horticulture is underscored, along with its multifaceted impacts and policy implications. the potential benefits and address the challenges associated with the integration of digital technologies in horticultural practices. Ultimately, the paper envisions a technologically empowered agricultural landscape, marking a pivotal step toward sustainable, efficient, and data-driven horticulture.

Keywords: Digital farming, Remote Sensing,Artificial Intelligenc

II. Digital Farming Technologies in Horticulture

- **Remote Sensing and Imaging Techniques**

Drones and satellites equipped with imaging capabilities offer real-time aerial views for crop monitoring.

They enable precise identification of stressed areas, monitoring crop health, and assessing field conditions.

Satellite imaging provides broader coverage, aiding in observing large land areas and detecting anomalies.

- **Sensor Technology for Soil Monitoring:**

Soil sensors offer real-time data on soil moisture, nutrient levels, pH, and temperature.

Continuous monitoring assists in precise irrigation scheduling, fertilizer application, and overall soil health management.

Data obtained aids in optimizing resource usage and enhancing crop growth.

- **IoT (Internet of Things) Devices in Horticulture:**

IoT devices create interconnected systems that collect and transmit data across the farm.

Devices such as weather stations and automated irrigation systems offer real-time insights for efficient farm management.

They optimize resource usage, like water and energy, through data-driven decision-making.

- **Data Analytics and Artificial Intelligence in Crop Management:**

Advanced algorithms process data from various sources, providing predictive models and disease detection algorithms.

AI-driven tools enable data-driven decisions, optimizing planting strategies, predicting risks, and enhancing overall crop productivity.

These technologies empower farmers with actionable insights for informed decision-making.

III. Crop Monitoring and Management

- **Precision Irrigation Systems:**

Utilize sensor data for targeted delivery of water and nutrients to crops.

Enhance crop health and yield by minimizing water wastage and over-irrigation.

Technologies include drip irrigation and automated scheduling based on real-time data.

- **Remote Crop Health Monitoring:**

Drones and satellites offer continuous monitoring of crop health through imaging. Identify stress factors, diseases, and nutrient deficiencies early on.

Facilitate timely interventions, preventing crop losses and optimizing treatment.

- **Smart Pest and Disease Detection:**

Imaging techniques and AI algorithms detect pests, diseases, and anomalies.

Machine learning identifies patterns to flag potential issues in crops.

Early detection allows targeted interventions, reducing disease spread and crop damage.

IV. Benefits and Impacts of Digital Farming in Horticulture

- **Automated Harvesting and Yield Estimation:**

Robotics and AI models streamline harvesting processes.

Robotic systems identify and harvest ripe produce, reducing labour costs.

Yield estimation models predict crop yields, aiding in planning and resource allocation.

- **Improved Resource Efficiency :**

Precision technologies optimize resource application based on real-time data.

Precision irrigation reduces water wastage, while targeted use of fertilizers and pesticides minimizes environmental impact and costs.

- **Enhanced Crop Yield and Quality:**

Data-driven decision-making improves crop management, leading to increased yields.

Remote monitoring and timely interventions preserve crop quality, resulting in better-quality produce.

Reduced resource wastage and optimized inputs lead to cost savings. Increased yields and better-quality produce enhance market value and profitability.

Automation decreases labor costs, improving economic viability.

- **Environmental Sustainability:**

Efficient resource management and reduced chemical usage promote sustainability. Minimized runoff protects water sources and ecosystems, fostering environmental health. Sustainable practices maintain soil health and biodiversity for long-term sustainability.

Technological Barriers and Costs:

Limited access and affordability of advanced technologies hinder widespread adoption, especially for smaller farms.

High initial investment and maintenance costs pose financial challenges for farmers. Continuous technology updates and potential obsolescence add to ongoing expenses.

Data Security and Privacy Concerns:

Extensive data collection raises concerns about privacy and security. Safeguarding farm data from cyber threats and unauthorized access is crucial. Compliance with data protection regulations and establishing secure data-sharing protocols is essential.

Integration and Adoption Challenges in Agriculture:

Incorporating digital technologies into traditional agricultural practices requires a shift in mindset and training.

Resistance to change and lack of awareness about the benefits of digital farming hinder adoption.

Compatibility issues between different technologies can hinder seamless integration.

Examples of Digital Farming Implementation in Horticulture:

Precision Irrigation: Sensor-based systems led to reduced water usage while maintaining or improving crop yields.

Remote Disease Monitoring: Drones identified diseases early, allowing timely intervention and preventing crop losses.

IoT-enabled Crop Management: IoT devices facilitated real-time data collection, aiding in precise nutrient application and pest control.

Real-world Applications and Results:

Yield and Quality Improvement: Farmers observed increased yields and better produce quality after adopting digital farming practices.

Cost Savings and Resource Efficiency: Reduced resource usage, such as water and pesticides, resulted in cost savings and environmental benefits.

Informed Decision-making: Access to real-time data empowered farmers to make informed decisions, optimizing planting, resource allocation, and pest management.

Emerging Trends in Digital Farming Technologies:

AI and Machine Learning Advancements: Continued integration for more accurate predictive models and automated decision-making.

Enhanced Sensor Technology: Development of more advanced sensors for precise and comprehensive data collection.

Blockchain for Traceability: Use of blockchain to ensure transparency and traceability in the supply chain.

Potential Impact on Future Agriculture Practices:

Increased Sustainability: Digital farming could lead to more sustainable practices by minimizing resource wastage and optimizing inputs.

Resilience to Challenges: Advanced monitoring can help anticipate and mitigate the effects of climate change, pests, and diseases.

Data-Driven Decision-making: A shift towards data-driven approaches empowers farmers with actionable insights for precision agriculture.

Research and Development Directions:

IoT Integration: Focus on seamless integration among IoT devices to create comprehensive agricultural ecosystems.AI in Crop Breeding:

Advancements in AI for optimizing crop breeding, enhancing resilience, and productivity. Policy Development: Creating policies supporting digital technology integration in agriculture, including data-sharing protocols and privacy regulations.

Policy Considerations for Promoting Digital Farming:

Financial Support: Providing subsidies or grants to assist farmers in adopting digital farming technologies. R&D Funding: Allocating resources for research and development in digital farming to foster innovation.

Education and Training: Developing educational programs and training initiatives to educate farmers about digital technologies.

Supportive Measures for Farmers and Industries:

Technical Assistance: Offering guidance and support to farmers in implementing and maintaining digital farming systems.

Infrastructure Development: Investing in infrastructure, including internet connectivity and data-sharing platforms.

Collaborative Partnerships: Encouraging partnerships between agricultural industries, tech firms, and research institutions to drive innovation.

Regulatory Frameworks and Standards:

Data Protection and Privacy: Establishing regulations safeguarding data ownership, privacy, and sharing in agricultural data collection.

Interoperability Standards: Developing standards for seamless integration among different digital farming technologies.

Quality Assurance: Setting standards to ensure reliability, accuracy, and performance of digital farming tools.

Summary of Key Findings and Contributions:

Digital farming technologies offer diverse opportunities for optimizing resource usage and improving crop management practices.

Real-world case studies demonstrate tangible benefits such as increased yields, improved quality, and cost savings through digital farming implementations.

Challenges like technological barriers and data security concerns necessitate strategic solutions for wider adoption.

Closing Remarks on the Transformative Potential of Digital Farming in Horticulture:

Digital farming stands as a promising avenue for revolutionizing horticulture by enabling precision agriculture and empowering farmers with data-driven decision-making capabilities.

Despite challenges, addressing these hurdles through supportive policies, collaborations, and ongoing research efforts can pave the way for a sustainable and efficient agricultural future.

The transformative potential of digital farming signifies a fundamental shift towards a more resilient, sustainable, and technologically empowered agricultural landscape

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Nano materials in health Care

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Abstract:

"Nanomaterials have emerged as a transformative force in healthcare, showcasing immense potential in revolutionizing diagnostics, therapeutics, and medical device technology. Operating at the nanoscale, these materials exhibit unique physicochemical properties that enable precise interactions with biological systems, offering novel solutions to longstanding healthcare challenges. This abstract explores the multifaceted roles of nanomaterials in healthcare, encompassing targeted drug delivery systems, advanced diagnostic tools with heightened sensitivity, tissue engineering for regenerative medicine, and enhanced medical devices. While presenting promising opportunities for personalized and minimally invasive treatments, the abstract also addresses safety concerns, ethical considerations, and the imperative for comprehensive education and outreach to ensure responsible and effective integration of nanomaterials in healthcare."

Keywords: Nano medicine, Dendrimers, Liposome, Nanoparticle Albumin-bound (nab)

Nanomaterials have emerged as powerful tools in revolutionizing healthcare, offering unprecedented opportunities to address challenges in diagnosis, treatment, and disease management. At the nanoscale, these materials exhibit exceptional properties that enable precise interactions with biological systems, opening new frontiers in medicine. From targeted drug delivery systems to innovative diagnostic tools and advanced tissue engineering, the integration of nanomaterials in healthcare holds immense promise for

transforming the landscape of medical interventions, paving the way for more effective, personalized, and minimally invasive treatments.

Nanomedicine is a broad-spectrum field of science and technology that unites multiple streams of medical applications such as disease treatment and diagnosis, disease prevention, pain relieving technologies, human health improvement medicine, nanoscale technology against traumatic injury, and treatment options for diseases. Thus, an interdisciplinary approach is being adopted to apply the outcomes of biotechnology, nanomaterials, biomedical robotics, and genetic engineering combined under the broad category of nanomedicine.

Nanotechnology in Diagnosis

Nanoparticle platforms have been developed and optimized for the detection of pathogens and cancer biomarkers such that diagnostic procedures now become less cumbersome but more sensitive because most of the complex procedures are now integrated onto a simple device having the capacity to be used for on-the-spot diagnosis.

Nanomedicine is an emerging approach for the implementation of nanotechnological systems in disease diagnosis and therapy. This branch of nanotechnology can be classified in two main categories: nanodevices and nanomaterials. Nanodevices are miniature devices at nanoscale including microarrays and some intelligent machines like reciprocates. Nanomaterials contain particles smaller than 100 nanometres (nm) in at least one dimension.

The application of conventional therapeutic agents has limitations such as non-selectivity, undesirable side effects, low efficiency, and poor biodistribution. Therefore, the focus of current research activities is to design well-controlled and multifunctional delivery systems.

As soon as nanoparticles enter to the bloodstream, they are prone to aggregation and protein opsonization (protein binding to nanoparticle surface as a tag for immune system recognition). The

opsonized nanoparticles could be cleared from the bloodstream by phagocytosis or filtration in the liver, spleen, and kidney. This rapid and non-specific clearance by the immune system results in decreased retention time and thus limits bioavailability. By decorating the nanoparticle surface with polyethylene glycol (PEG), carbohydrates, acetyl groups, or protein moieties (arginine-glycine-aspartate (RGD) peptide, albumin), retention time can be altered

Size is another important factor playing role in controlling circulation and biodistribution of therapeutic nanoparticles. Nanoparticles smaller than 10 nm, can be easily cleared by physiological systems (filtration through the kidney), while particles larger than 200 nm may be cleared by phagocytic cells in the reticuloendothelial system (RES). Accordingly, therapeutic nanoparticles with a size of <100 nm have longer circulation time in the bloodstream. Many studies reported that therapeutic nanoparticles in 20–200 nm size showed a higher accumulation rate in tumors because they cannot be recognized by the RES and filtrated by the kidney

Nanoparticle drug delivery:

Nanoparticle drug delivery systems are engineered technologies that use nanoparticles for the targeted delivery and controlled release of therapeutic agents. The modern form of a drug delivery system should minimize side-effects and reduce both dosage and dosage frequency. Recently, nanoparticles have aroused attention due to their potential application for effective drug delivery.

The National Institute of Biomedical Imaging and Bioengineering has issued the following prospects for future research in nanoparticle drug delivery systems:

1. crossing the blood-brain barrier (BBB) in brain diseases and disorders;
2. enhancing targeted intracellular delivery to ensure the treatments reach the correct structures inside cells;

3. combining diagnosis and treatment.

The development of new drug systems is time-consuming; it takes approximately seven years to complete fundamental research and development before advancing to preclinical animal studies.

Nanoparticle drug delivery focuses on maximizing drug efficacy and minimizing cytotoxicity. Fine-tuning nanoparticle properties for effective drug delivery involves addressing the following factors. The surface-area-to-volume ratio of nanoparticles can be altered to allow for more ligand binding to the surface. Increasing ligand binding efficiency can decrease dosage and minimize nanoparticle toxicity. Minimizing dosage or dosage frequency also lowers the mass of nanoparticle per mass of drug, thus achieving greater efficiency.

Current nanoparticle drug delivery systems can be cataloged based on their platform composition into several groups: polymeric nanoparticles, inorganic nanoparticles, viral nanoparticles, lipid-based nanoparticles, and nanoparticle albumin-bound (nab) technology. Each family has its unique characteristics.

Polymeric nanoparticles

Polymeric nanoparticles are synthetic polymers with a size ranging from 10 to 100 nm. Common synthetic polymeric nanoparticles include polyacrylamide, polyacrylate,—and chitosan.¹ Drug molecules can be incorporated either during or after polymerization.

Dendrimers

Dendrimers are unique hyper-branched synthetic polymers with monodispersed size, well-defined structure, and a highly functionalized terminal surface. They are typically composed of synthetic or natural amino acid, nucleic acids, and carbohydrates. Therapeutics can be loaded with relative ease onto the interior of the dendrimers or the terminal surface of the branches via electrostatic interaction, hydrophobic interactions, hydrogen bonds, chemical linkages, or covalent conjugation. Drug-dendrimer conjugation can elongate the half-life of drugs.

Inorganic Nanoparticles and Nanocrystals

Inorganic nanoparticles have emerged as highly valuable functional building blocks for drug delivery systems due to their well-defined and highly tunable properties such as size, shape, and surface functionalization. Inorganic nanoparticles have been largely adopted to biological and medical applications ranging from imaging and diagnoses to drug delivery.¹ Inorganic nanoparticles are usually composed of inert metals such as gold and titanium that form nanospheres, however, iron oxide nanoparticles have also become an option.

Toxicity

While application of inorganic nanoparticles in bionanotechnology shows encouraging advancements from a materials science perspective, the use of such materials in vivo is limited by issues related with toxicity, biodistribution and bioaccumulation. Because metal inorganic nanoparticle systems degrade into their constituent metal atoms, challenges may arise from the interactions of these materials with biosystems, and a considerable amount of the particles may remain in the body after treatment, leading to buildup of metal particles potentially resulting in toxicity.

Organic Nanocrystals

Organic nanocrystals consist of pure drugs and surface active agents required for stabilization. They are defined as carrier-free submicron colloidal drug delivery systems with a mean particle size in the nanometer range. The primary importance of the formulation of drugs into nanocrystals is the increase in particle surface area in contact with the dissolution medium, therefore increasing bioavailability. A number of drug products formulated in this way are on the market.

Liposome delivery

Liposomes are spherical vesicles composed of synthetic or natural phospholipids that self-assemble in aqueous solution in sizes ranging from tens of nanometers to micrometers. The resulting vesicle, which

has an aqueous core surrounded by a hydrophobic membrane, can be loaded with a wide variety of hydrophobic or hydrophilic molecules for therapeutic purposes.

Biological Nanocarriers

Viruses can be used to deliver genes for genetic engineering or gene therapy. Commonly used viruses include adenoviruses, retroviruses, and various bacteriophages. The surface of the viral particle can also be modified with ligands to increase targeting capabilities. While viral vectors can be used to great efficacy, one concern is that may cause off-target effects due to its natural tropism. This usually requires replacing the proteins causing virus-cell interactions with chimeric proteins.

Nanoparticle Albumin-bound (nab) Technology

Nanoparticle albumin-bound technology utilizes the protein albumin as a carrier for hydrophobic chemotherapy drugs through noncovalent binding. Because albumin is already a natural carrier of hydrophobic particles and is able to transcytose molecules bound to itself, albumin composed nanoparticles have become an effective strategy for the treatment of many diseases in clinical research.

Delivery and Release mechanism

An ideal drug delivery system should have effective targeting and controlled release. The two main targeting strategies are passive targeting and active targeting. Passive targeting depends on the fact that tumors have abnormally structured blood vessels that favor accumulation of relatively large macromolecules and nanoparticles. This so-called enhanced permeability and retention effect (EPR) allows the drug-carrier be transported specifically to the tumor cells. Active targeting is, as the name suggests, much more specific and is achieved by taking advantage of receptor-ligand interactions at the surface of the cell membrane.

Toxicity:

Some of the same properties that make nanoparticles efficient drug carriers also contribute to their toxicity. For example, gold nanoparticles are known to interact with proteins through surface adsorption, forming a protein corona, which can be utilized for cargo loading and immune shielding. However, this protein-adsorption property can also disrupt normal protein function that is essential for homeostasis, especially when the protein contains exposed sulfur groups.

Conclusion:

In conclusion, nanoparticle drug delivery systems represent a groundbreaking approach with the potential to revolutionize the field of medicine. Their ability to encapsulate, protect, and precisely deliver therapeutic agents to targeted sites offers numerous advantages, including enhanced drug efficacy, reduced side effects, and improved patient outcomes. However, challenges such as long-term safety, scalability, and regulatory considerations persist, warranting continued research and development. Despite these hurdles, the immense promise of nanoparticle drug delivery systems underscores their pivotal role in shaping the future of pharmaceuticals, paving the way for more precise, personalized, and effective therapies across a wide spectrum of diseases and medical conditions

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